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Optimizely hack: check the third-party scripts on your site

On 16 November 2026, attackers used Optimizely to put malware on the websites of 178 organisations. How to check the third-party scripts on your own site.

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On 16 November 2026, an attacker added malicious code to the websites of at least 178 organisations, among them the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, HSBC and IKEA. Nobody changed the code of these sites. The malware came through Optimizely, a testing tool that the sites load on every page.

Most small businesses do not use Optimizely. But most business websites load code from other companies: analytics, a chat widget, a booking form, a review badge, a cookie banner. Each of these tools can put code on your pages in the same way.

How the attack used Optimizely

Optimizely Web lets a business test versions of its pages. The business adds one script from Optimizely to its site. That script also runs any custom JavaScript that the business types into its Optimizely project.

According to Optimizely's status page, an unauthorised party used a flaw in the account signup flow to impersonate users on customer accounts. It then added malicious JavaScript to their projects. Optimizely's servers delivered that code to visitors, from the same address that the sites already trusted.

Optimizely says it detected the activity on the day it began, closed the flaw within three hours and removed the code from all affected projects. It says this was not a breach of customer passwords, and that fewer than 5% of its customers were affected.

What the code did to visitors

Scott Helme of Report URI found the infected scripts. In his analysis, 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely scripts that his team fetched contained the malware. The first injection was at 04:21 UTC. All infected files were clean by 23:11 UTC the same day.

During those hours, the code did three things:

  • It replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses on the page and in the clipboard with addresses of the attacker. By the evening of 16 November, Report URI saw about $7,000 arrive in these wallets.
  • From 13:43 UTC, it read card numbers, expiry dates and security codes that visitors typed into checkout forms.
  • On older iPhones and iPads, it loaded exploit kits that attack iOS. It is not known if any device was compromised.

StepSecurity's analysis adds one limit: the skimmer "cannot read card fields inside a cross-origin payment iframe". Cards typed into a payment form that Stripe, Adyen or a similar provider hosts in its own frame were safe.

Optimizely was not the only route. Report URI says the same attacker reached other sites from 13 November through scripts from Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media.

Why a trusted script is a risk for any website

A script from another company runs with the same rights as your own code. It can read what visitors type, change the page and send data out. If the company that supplies the script is attacked, your website serves the attacker's code. Nothing changes on your own server.

A Content Security Policy (CSP) is a header that tells the browser which scripts a page can run and where it can send data. Report URI checked the CSP of affected organisations. 24 sites blocked the payload, and 68 sites had no CSP at all. A policy that allowed the Optimizely address did not help, because the malicious code came from that address. A strict rule on where the page can send data (connect-src) stopped the card and cookie theft, but not the address swap.

The Register reports that Optimizely lets customers add their own code to pages without changing the site code. Tag managers and many marketing tools give the same option.

For a wider set of basic checks, see our article on the NIST small business cybersecurity guide.

What to do this week

  1. 01List every third-party script that your website loads.Your web developer can export the list from the page source or from your tag manager.
  2. 02Remove the scripts that nobody uses any more.A tool that you stopped paying for can still run code on every page.
  3. 03Keep third-party scripts off your checkout and login pages.On these pages, load only what the page needs to work.
  4. 04Take card payments in a form that your payment provider hosts.The Optimizely skimmer could not read cards typed into a hosted payment frame.
  5. 05Check who has access to your tag manager, testing and marketing tools.Remove old users and turn on two-step login, because these accounts can put code on your site.
  6. 06Ask your developer to add a Content Security Policy in report-only mode first.Then make it strict, especially on the pages that collect payments or passwords.
  7. 07If you use Optimizely Web, check the Project JavaScript field of every project for code that you did not add.Treat card data typed into your own forms on 16 November as possibly exposed.

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