Cursor extension backdoor: checks for teams using AI code tools
A tampered Claude Code extension in the Cursor marketplace planted a backdoor on 29 October 2026. What it did, who is affected and the checks for your team.
On 29 October 2026, a tampered copy of the Claude Code extension was available in the Cursor extension marketplace for about 11 hours. Cursor is an AI code editor. It planted a backdoor on the computers that installed it. Cursor told WIRED that "at most 5,000 users" downloaded it.
If your developers or contractors use Cursor, check their computers. Uninstalling the extension does not remove the backdoor.
Which versions and which dates
The Cursor security notice names versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 of the Anthropic.claude-code extension, on macOS and Windows. They were live from about 2:27am to 1:35pm Pacific Time on 29 October 2026.
Felix Rieseberg of Anthropic wrote on X that Anthropic did not build or publish the tampered copy, that its official channels are not affected, and that "this only impacts Cursor users."
What the backdoor did
According to WIRED, Phorion, a detection company, found the extension first, on a customer's Mac. Its technical analysis describes these steps:
- The code runs when the editor loads the extension. The user does not need to use it.
- It adds an attacker SSH key with the label
svc-telemetryto~/.ssh/authorized_keys. This key lets the attacker log in to the computer. - It tries to turn on remote login and open a tunnel to an attacker server.
- It installs a startup item so that it runs again after a restart. On a Mac this is a LaunchAgent with the name
com.apple.sysmond. On Windows it is a scheduled task with the nameSysMon. - It sends the computer name, the user name, the Git email address, the public IP address and up to 40 environment variable names to the attacker. The names are the ones that contain words such as KEY, TOKEN, SECRET or PASS. Phorion says that the values are not sent.
Why most computers were not opened
The tunnel needs remote login, and remote login needs administrator rights. Cursor says that the extension did not have these rights on most macOS and Windows computers. Phorion also found errors in the attacker's code that stopped the last step.
This does not make a computer safe. The key and the startup item stay on the computer. Phorion says that if remote login was already on, or is turned on later, "the backdoor is ready and waiting." Cursor says that the attacker server is offline now.
What is not known
- Cursor and Anthropic did not say how the attacker got the access to publish in the Cursor marketplace. Cursor did not answer WIRED's question about this.
- "At most 5,000" is the number of downloads. The number of computers where the tunnel worked is not published.
- No source says who the attacker is.
The Register reports that Cursor removed the versions, shut down the marketplace, checked the other extensions and rotated its keys before it opened the marketplace again.
AI tools often get wide access to a work computer, as we described in our article on Full Disk Access for AI agents on the Mac.
Checks for computers that run Cursor
- Ask every developer and contractor if they use Cursor.
- On each Mac, run this command in Terminal:
grep -qs svc-telemetry ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && echo "found" || echo "not found". If it shows "found", the computer is affected. For Windows, the Cursor notice gives a PowerShell command. - Do not stop at uninstalling the extension. Use the clean-up scripts in the Cursor notice, which also remove the startup items, the tunnel processes and the SSH key.
- On an affected computer, change the passwords and keys that the user can reach from it. Do this from a clean computer.
- Check that remote login is off on work Macs that do not need it: System Settings, General, Sharing, Remote Login.
- Give developers normal user accounts, not administrator accounts, for daily work. In this attack, missing administrator rights were one reason the tunnel failed.